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2 COMMUNITY  SUPPORT  FOR  STRUCTURAL  ADJUSTMENT  IN  THE  ACP 
COUNTRIES: TOWARDS THE CONSOLIDATION AND STRENGTHENING OF A 
REALISTIC AND CONCERTED APPROACH. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Community is  a major technical  and financial  partner of the ACP countries and  it 
was natural, therefore, that those implementing economic adjustment programmes should 
have approached the Community for assistance. 
There were various specific reasons for  this.  The countries were facing unprecedented 
economic  and  financial  difficulties,  which  required  the  commitment  of appropriate 
financial resources; or else they were still not reaping the benefits, in the form of desired 
economic growth rates, from the reforms that they were implementing at high social cost; 
or, further, they were experiencing difficulties in their negotiations with those unavoidable 
financial  partners in the sphere of adjustment, the Bretton Woods institutions.  All  these 
factors explain the ACPs' wish to involve the Community, both in  the assessment of their 
programmes and in the financial  support which it could bring to them. 
The Community  met these expectations and  by  the  end  of negotiations with the  ACP 
countries support for structural adjustment was fonnally provided for in the fourth Lome 
Convention. 
This  decision  constituted  a  major  political  act.  It  was  the  first  time  that,  in  such  a 
sensitive, perhaps even controversial, matter, specific provisions laying down objectives, 
guidelines and implementation methods for adjustment support had been freely negotiated 
between the developing countries and their external  partners. 
The first interim report setting out guidelines and practical arrangements for involving the 
Community in structural adjustment in the ACP countries resulted in a Council resolution 
adopted in May 1992. In it the Council reaffinned the need for the Community to help 
restore  the  major  macroeconomic  balances  in  the  countries  concerned,  against  the 
background of the wider aim of creating conditions for the resumption of growth and an 
improvement in the welfare of the people. 
The  joint  reports  presented  by  the  ACP-EEC  Development  Finance  Cooperation 
Committee to the ACP-EEC Council of  Ministers in March 1992 and April  1993, and the 
ACP-EEC Council resolutions resulting from them, endorsed the measures adopted since 
the signing of the Convention and the main guidelines for future action in implementing 
structural adjustment support. 
There can of course be only one reform  programll)e in  any given country. Advancing 
beyond  the  specifically  financial  aspect  of making  funding  available  for  adjustment 
support,  and  rather than  leaving it to the Bretton Woods institUtions  to determine the 
reform programme and then insert the Community support component, the Commission 
3 followed  the  prompting  of the  Convention  and  opted  for  a more  ambitious  approach 
consisting in  providing an  input into the design of the programme itself. 
The  intention  was  not  to  open  up  parallel  lines  of action  but  rather  to  ensure  that 
Community  concerns as  expressed  in  the  text  of the  Convention  were taken  fully  into 
account when reform  programmes were drawn  up. 
With  its role as  a major player in  the  economic adjustment process acknowledged,  the 
Commission concentrated on developing its expertise by focusing its efforts on the factors 
regarded as essential  in the light of the Convention,  namely:  finding  a balance between 
adjustment  and  long-term  development,  adjusting the pace of reform  to  each  country's 
specific  capacities  and  constraints  (including  social  and  political  resources  and 
constraints},  making  allowance for  the  regional  dimension  and  safeguarding the  social 
sectors, this last being the key  to the sustainability of the process by  combining growth 
objectives with considerations of equity. 
In  order to  establish  its  credibility the  Commission acted  quickly  to formulate a short-
term  core of priority actions: 
(i)  first,  by  ensuring stricter coherence between all  Community instruments (Stabex, 
food aid, etc) in order to comprise not only a "critical mass" in the financial  sense 
but  also  to  provide  a  significant  package  of effective  economic  and  sectoral 
reforms; 
(ii)  in  addition,  by  taking  an  increasingly  active  interest  in  public  finance  in  the 
countries concerned,  in  order to  help  them  improve their budget  procedures  iii 
tenns of transparency,  integrity,  efficiency. and  equity,  and  to identify means of 
checking compliance by  the  ACP  States with their budget undertakings, thereby 
providing security for the financial  assistance provided by  the Community; 
(iii)  lastly,  by  strengthening coordination with  other donors - including the  Member 
States, the IMF and the World Bank -both at the programme design stage and at 
the operational  level, in  order to exert a moderating influence on  the process by 
arguing wherever possible for a strict but also realistic approach to adjustment, 
differentiated where appropriate, and above all  humane. 
At the same time the Community implemented a series of support programmes to  help 
some thirty  ACP  countries meet  their financing  requirements in  1991-92  and  again  in 
1993-94. 
Meanwhile, major international discussions were taking place on structural adjustment and 
its effects and implementation, the question of renewing the IMF's Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility (ESAF) and  the  prospects for the third  phase of the SPA
1 to cover 
Special Programme of Assistance for  Africa. 
4 the years  1994-96. These discussions were based, in  general,  on the ini.tial  conclusions 
of the studies carried out by those variously involved in  the adjustment process. 
The Community has also embarked upon  important negotiations for the renewal  of the 
Financial Protocol under the fourth Lome Convention, in which structural adjustment will 
retain a significant place. 
Now is therefore a particularly good time to take stock of the quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of the Community's involvement in  support for economic reform, to summarise 
current  thinking and  to spell  out  all  the  lessons  to  be drawn  from  the  first  round  of 
Community involvement, in terms both of resources mobilized and the general approach 
adopted. 
The  gravity  of  the  situation  of  the  ACP  States  in  general - and  of  Africa  in 
particular - together with the reservations forming  part of the conclusions to be drawn 
from  a  decade  of adjustment  in  the  region  call  for  concerted  action  by  the  donor 
community, in  which the European Union has a major role to play. 
I.  THE CONTEXT OF COMMUNITY ACTION 
1.  An international climate still  workin~: a~:ainst the ACP 
External factors have continued to be unfavourable and have helped produce particularly 
difficult  economic conditions for  the  countries under adjustment,  thus  dampening the 
positive effects expected from  supply side reforms and aggravating the adverse impact 
of financial  reform policies. 
The deterioration in the terms of trade and the downward trend of prices for the main 
commodities (coffee, cocoa, phosphates, oilseeds, etc.) to levels lower than at any time 
since the Second World War,. together with price and  exchange rate instability,  had a 
proportionately  greater  impact  on  countries  with  economies  largely  dependent  on 
commodities, notably agricultural commodities. 
Commodity  agreements,  negotiations on  which  have become seriously  bogged down, 
failed to provide a means of offsetting certain adverse effects of market trends. 
The  high  interest  rates  of recent  times  and  the  dwindling  or even  disappearance of 
external  private. capital  flows have in  many  cases worsened external balances, already 
affected in  most of the countries concerned by  structural trade deficits.  The combined 
effect of the overall unfavourable world trade situation, from the standpoint of the ACP 
countries, stemming from pressure exerted by newcomers on world markets (countries in 
south  and  south-cast  Asia,  for  example)  in .a  climate of fierce  trade  rivalry  between 
Europe, the United States and Japan, and also the absence of the ACP countries from the 
major international negotiations, resulted in a continual shrinking of markets, in the face 
of which the measures adopted by the countries concerned (not always convincingly, it 
is true) with regard to productivity, competitiveness or exchange rates were of no avail. 
5 On top of this external debt has continued to increase during the adjustment period, with 
a steep increase in the portion of the debt that cannot be rescheduled, despite the fact that 
in  recent years appreciable progress has been made in the treatment of debt.  The burden 
of this debt and  the need for adjustment measures geared to dealing with it have become 
an  unavoidable aspect of adjustment programmes. 
2.  A_narticulnrly unstable social and political hacl<ground 
War and  serious political  disturbances have continued  in  some countries - especially in 
Africa - bringing instability even  as' they  search for  new and  more democratic systems. 
Political  instability and  the uncertainties dogging  the  initial  moves  towards  democracy 
have  in  many  instances  upset  the  delicate  balance  between  the  social  and  political 
background  and  the  economic  policies  from  which  the  people,  after  decades  of 
quiescence,  arc  now  entitled  to  expect  positive results  in  terms  of living standards and 
social  progress. 
At the same time those newly responsible for government are themselves having to come 
to  terms  with  democracy,  with  its  train  of agreements  to  be  reached  and  social  and 
political  balances to  be  struck,  and  realizing that  while  the  favourable  effects  of their 
economic  policies  may  be  slow  in  coming,  their  adverse  consequences  accrue 
immediately. 
3.  Disappearance of traditional economic development growth centres 
The countries which  in the past provided (or might have provided) the driving force for 
development in their region, pulling their neighbours' economies along with them to some 
extent, have lost a great deal of their influence, either because of the particularly serious 
nature of the economic and financial situation they themselves are facing, or because they 
arc having to  deal  with social  and  political  disturbances degenerating substantially into 
virtual civil  war,  or else because, failing to find  the necessary degree of consensus, they 
end by  drifting inevitably towards a compounding of both  kinds of crisis. 
The situation  in  Africa is  particularly striking from  this point of view since the former 
economic heavyweights are today  in  the most serious difficulties.  It is to be hoped that 
the recent devaluation of the CFA franc will  enable some of these countries to shake off 
the crisis and  thereby return to the path  of growth. 
4.  Strong international competition for available financial resources 
Although the international  community has  endeavoured on  many  occasions to  reassure 
the developing countries, a number of developments in  recent months indicate that they 
are tending to receive relatively less attention, at least in terms of financial  resources that 
arc available or can  be made available. 
6 The  renewal  of the  ESAF,  the  IMF's  most  concessional  instrument  for  supporting 
structural adjustment policies - and  one targeted on  the poorest countries - has run  into 
problems stemming from  lack of financial  resources fo11owing  the withdrawal  of some 
bilateral  donors. 
The last SPA meeting revealed a difficulty - not previously encountered in that. forum- in 
finding all the funds required for phase 3, which was planned to meet the financing needs 
of the countries concerned for the years 1994-96. So far,  Jess  than  70% of requirements 
is  cove.red  and  there  is  a  danger that  adjustment  in  the countries  concerned  will  be 
underfinanced - and hence ineffective - unless corrective measures are taken.  Failing a 
significant additional financial  effort on the part of donors, the source of such measures 
can lie only in  more radical treatment of the countries' external debt. 
In  this connection it is vital to understand that in spite of all the undertakings given there 
is still  no long-tern1  solution to the debt problem, since the amount owed has increased 
steadily and the overall  effect of successive reschedulings has merely been to shift the 
heaviest part of the burden into the future. 
5.  Yet economic adjustment had become inevitable for most ACP countries 
Adjustment aims to  restore various kinds of economic balance where these have been 
upset and to adapt economies to the facts of a changed international economic situation. 
It became an unavoidable necessity for the countries concerned because of their critical 
economic,  financial  and,  consequently,  social  difficulti~s and the tottering structure of 
their economies. 
Some developing countries were able to postpone this adjustment process through massive 
borrowing,  but  it  is  now  clear  that  they  could  put  it  off no  longer;  as  a  logical 
consequence, the adjustment issue now dominates relations between developing countries 
and .their external partners and has become the required basis of dialogue between them 
and the donors. 
In  these  circumstances,  a  growing  proportion  of the  funds  channelled  to developing 
countries is  allocated by reference to adjustment programmes, and no debt processing 
operation can be carried out unless the debtor country has first concludc(t an  agreement 
with the International Monetary Fund. This fact demonstrates to what extent adjustment 
has beco.me an absolute necessity for the vast majority of ACP countries.  · 
II.  SOME FIGURES 
1.  Commun.ity contribution 
Between  the  entry  into  force  of Lome  IV  and  the  end  of September  I 994,  the 
Commission  adopted  54  financing  decisions  allocating  to  36  countries  eligible  for 
structural adjustment support a total ofECU 1 098 million, made up of ECU ~56 million 
7 in special  structural adjustment resources and ECU 242 million from national indicative 
programme resources. 
By the  end  of 1994,  the  total  will  have  risen  to  an  estimated  ECU  I  180  million, 
including ECU 920 million in special structural adjustment resources (out of a grand total 
of ECU I  150 million provided for under the Convention). 
In  1990 and  1991,  the first allocation was assigned to 41  potentially eligible countries, 
of  which  35  were  notified  of their  first  allocation,  in  line  with  Article  281  of the 
Convention: 
By the end of 1992 only  21  of these countries had  managed, with the financial  support 
of the Community, to put their structural adjustment programmes into effect. 
This means that half of the potentially eligible countries have been unable to exploit that 
eligibi,ity, and that funds available to active countries have been frozen. There are several 
reasons  for  this.  The  most  important  of these  have  been  the  linkage  between  the 
automatic eligibility established in the Convention and the position of the Bretton Woods 
institutions  in  their  reviews  of programme  performance  (including  their  reaction  to 
programmes going wrong), but also the relatively frequent infringements of democratic 
processes and human rights (a key element of the Convention) during the first few years 
of implementation. 
2.  Distribution of resources 
In  response to this situation,  a new method of distributing resources was used  for the 
second allocation, based on a more direct link between eligibility, allocation of funds and 
implementation, and on  annual disbursement targets for active countries, revised at the 
end of each financial  year. 
These new procedures made it possible to give more support to countries successfully 
pursuing their reform  programmes with  the help  of  ·the  main  donors,  and  to achieve 
higher disbursement rates. 
At the end of September 1994, from both allocations, of  the ECU 1 098 million approved 
in financing decisions some ECU 725 million (66%) had been disbursed, of which ECU 
600 million from  specific structural adjustment resources. 
3.  Use of instruments 
Community support has most frequently  taken the form of general import-programmes, 
this  being the  instrument  that  is  best  suited  to  the  requirements  of across-the-board 
economic liberalization, and to the needs of  convertible currency economies such as those 
of the franc zone,  given that the current regulations preclude giving direct  budgetary 
assistance to the countries concerned. This aid,  which is  made available to the central  banks of the countries concerned,  has 
provided economic operators with the currency they  require to pay for their imports. 
The programmes have generated counterpart funds that have been gradually integrated 
into  a  macroeconomic  approach  linked  with  financial  and  monetary  balances  in  the 
countries  concerned,  as  opposed  to  past  practice,  which  assigned  them  only  a 
micro-economic role. 
The funds have been used as part of a single, coordinated budget policy to cover public 
operating and capital expenditure, thus enabling the Community to act as the Convention 
directs in support of essential social services and the maintenance of economic and social 
infrastructure. 
Nearly  70% of the  counterpart funds  generated  by  the  financing  decisions  have been 
allocated  to  the  social  sector,  with  basic  health  care and  primary  education  the main 
beneficiaries, and nearly  10% has gone to the maintenance of infrastructure, particularly 
roads. Employment has received around 4% of the total, while financial restructuring in 
the agriculture and  parastatal sectors has accounted for the balance. 
In addition to allocating resources to national budgets, the Commission has also promoted 
structural changes in the budgets to target spending on the priority health and education 
sectors, and to reflect real needs in terms of infrastructure maintenance. This has entailed 
an ever-closer involvement in public expenditure reviews, often in collaboration with the 
World Bank. 
4.  Jmplcmentin~: conditions 
There has been no major problem in monitoring compliance with the conditions imposed 
with  regard  to the implementation of Community ,measures.  The organization of these 
conditions into a three-level  hierarchy has enabled a balance to be struck between the 
problem of subjectivity that can  affect the assessment of a general  programme and the 
importance  attached  to  special,  suspensive,  often  sector-specific,  conditions,  which 
together  comprise the basic factors determining the effectiveness of  Community support. 
The first-level  conditions arc of a general  nature, and allow the Community to remain 
independent in  its  assessment of the general  framework  of the  adjustment process in 
question. It is often at this level that the detail, and the sheer number, of the conditions 
specified in the "contracts" concluded with the Bretton Woods institutions can generate 
one-off delays and  ultimately create a "stop and go" policy situation. 
The Community.  has  managed to  avoid  such  delays  by  focusing  on  a  second  level  of 
conditionality consisting of  a few powerful and effective conditions reflecting the specific 
macro-economic and/or sectoral  objectives pursued,  although this approach  does entail 
the  risk  of a  temporary  breakdown  in  the  necessary  coordination  of the  measures 
conducted by the body of international donors as a whole. There is as yet no definitive 
solution to this problem. 
9 While an adequate degree of  non-negotiable detail is essential, common sense dictates the 
need  for  a  certain  amount  of flexibility,  which  will  obviously  contain  elements  of 
subjectivity if the aim  is to achieve something approaching a fair assessment of national 
constraints. 
The third group of conditions are administrative and financial. Here the Commission has 
developed a range of monitoring and inspection techniques that facilitate the integration 
of Community  support  into  the  procedural  framework  of the  country  concerned,  as 
regards both the provision of foreign exchange and the use of counterpart funds in  line 
with strict budgct=1ry  procedure. 
Experience has shown that  internal  procedures and  modalities for decision-making and 
payment are ill-suited to the requirements of the adjustment support instrument,  where 
the priority is to provide.rapid disbursement without sacrificing any administrative rigour. 
A major drive to rationalize monitoring and decision-making procedures has recently been 
carried out.  · 
III.  FIRST QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
1.  In-house 
·(a)  In  addition  to  the  harmonization  of  internal  control  procedures  and  the 
introduction  of  tailor-made  monitoring  and  inspection  procedures  in  the 
Commission and decentralized procedures at national level, there has b~en a major 
reorganization which has produced greater coherence among the Community's aid 
instruments,  based  on  their integration  with  sectoral  policies  and  on  a  clearer 
perception and better analysis of the macroeconomic situation in  each country. 
(b)  The Commission has developed its in-house expertise on the horizontal issues that 
are the  subject  of the  Convention's  main  guidelines  for  structural  adjustment 
support. 
Assessment  of the  social  aspects  involved  has  led  to new guidelines  on  food 
security and nutrition, health, education, training and employment. 
. One  of the  main  components  of the  practical  procedures  for  the  financial 
implementation of adjustment support is the use of counterpart funds as part of 
a coherent national budget strategy. The Commission has developed a procedure 
based on  the  Council  Resolution  of May  1991  whereby  a  blanket approach is 
adopted t~ all  counterpart funds, irrespective of the instrument by which they are 
generated. 
It is through the restructuring of  public expenditure that help for the priority social 
sectors will  have a  viable,  sustainable impact.  This explains the  Commission's 
10 increasing  involvement  in  public  expenditure  rev1ews,  which  has  Gntailed 
coordination with the other donors. 
The Commission's development of health,  employment,  education  and  training 
policies  will  facilitate  involvement  in  the  social  sectors  and  the  related  public 
expenditure decisions. 
(c)  In  line with  one of the Convention's main  guidelines,  a special  effort has  been 
made to allow for the  regional  aspects of adjustment,  particularly as regards the 
repercussions of  national adjustment measures on regional integration policies, and 
the need to  tailor national  policies to the regional  context.  The Commission has 
assessed the convergence of national economic policies at region.al  level  and the 
possibility of supporting the establishment of multilateral  monitoring schemes in 
some regions. 
(d)  As  its  evaluation  of the  impact  and  content  of adjustment  policies  and  the 
practical  aspects  of implementing  Community  support  has  taken  shape  nnd 
improved,  the  Commission  has  launched  a  series  of in-house  studies  on  such 
issues as.the sequence of reforms, the effectiveness of foreign exchange allocation 
systems, the pertinence of import programmes and the impact of the tax  system 
on  income distribution. 
2.  At Community levef 
The emphasis has been on strengthening coordination with the Member States along the 
following three lines: 
(i)  upgrading instruments and implementation procedures by bringing them into line 
with the requirements stipulated by the Member States and matching them to the 
macroeconomic framework within which they  operate; 
(ii)  developing a Community approach and the rmkings of a strategy in priority arc3s 
of Community action, e.g.  health and  agricultural  exports; 
(iii)  developing a framework of regular Community consultations prior to and during 
the course of  the meetings of  major international structural adjustment bodies; the 
structure mainly used for this purpose has so far been the SPA. 
However, Community coordination remains limited and  should be further developed. 
3.  At intern:ltional level 
It is probably at this level that the Commission's efforts to gain credibility for a specific 
Community voice have been most successful, particularly in the framework of the SPA. 
11 (a)  The Commission has actively  participated and  will  continue to participate in ad 
hoc working groups on: 
restructuring public expenditure and improving the efficiency of national  budget 
procedures through regular public expenditure reviews; 
general studies carried out by a number of bodies to assess the impact and results 
of structural adjustment; 
measures  to  combat  poverty  and  the  integration  of this  1ssue  m  structural 
adjustment programmes. 
(b)  Wherever possible,  the  Commission  has  urged  the  importance  of various  key 
issues, drawing them to the notice of other major donors. 
For example, the link between democracy and adjustment has been the subject of 
in-depth assessment jointly led by the Commission and the United States. The aim 
is  first  of all  to  avoid  the  short-term  negative  impact of economic  reform  on 
democratization,  e.g.  by  being  more  realistic  as  regards  the  timing  of  the 
introduction  and  intensification  of measures,  or  in  respect  of the  conditions 
imposed. It is also vital  to exploit  synergic~ between the two processes:  if they 
can be made to support each other, the long-term viability of the reforms will be 
better assured. The dialogue that develops in a democracy is the very essence of 
what has become known as the "internalization" of reform programmes; however, 
the democratization process can often be fragile,  and such dialogue is  bound to 
lead  to  certain  changes  which  may  temporarily  halt  the  reforms  in  a  given 
country.  It is  hard to strike the correct balance between the social  and  political 
consequences of  the changes ushered in by the imposition of economic discipline 
and the legitimate aspirations of the people,  who are entitled to expect positive 
economic results from the reforms. 
A  second factor,  already emphasized by  the Convention and  one which should 
become a major element. in  the adaptation of adjustment policies following the 
Commission's campaigning, is that of the pace of the reforms and the sequence 
in  which  they  are  introduced  in  line  with  the  specific  needs  of the  country 
concerned.  Several  studies  are  currently  being  carried  out  with  the  active 
participation of the Commission, with the aim of striking a balance between the 
sequence  of economic  and  financial  policies  required  by  the  gravity  of the 
situation  (e.g.  foreign  exchange  shortages,  non-financeable  budget  deficits  or 
liquidity crises), the importance of not stifling investment and the supply side in 
the long term,  and the need to make due allowance for the constraints imposed 
by the sQcial  and political liberalization process. 
The third issue actively promoted by the Commission is that of the implications 
of national structural adjustment policies for regional  integration prospects,  and 
more generally the regional consequences of national policies. This initiative has 
produced work in collaboration with the IDRD, the IMF and other donors such 
12 as  France and  the African  Development Bank,  in  West  Africa (with  the West 
African  Economic and  Monetary Union),· in  southern Africa,  the  Indian  Ocean 
(with the Cross Border Initiative) and, nearing completion, in Central Africa. The 
prospects for regional integration or its promotion have never been so positive, or 
so favourable as a path to growth. 
The Community remains a major partner of the ACP countries primarily because 
of the large sums of money made available for long-term investment, long-tenn 
social  and  economic  development  being  the  Convention's  most  important 
objective.  The sheer scale of the economic and financial  problems with  which 
most of the countries concerned are confronted could have resulted at one stage· 
in  long-term development aims being sacrificed to the imperatives of structural 
adjustment,  in  ·the  guise  of  restoring  the  major  financial  balances.  The 
Commission  has beel)  campaigning precisely  to make its partners aware of  .the 
need to reconcile the two sets of objectives and procedures. 
The general  conclusions of the SPA meeting of November  1993  show that the 
concerns the Commission has been expressing for several years are now on the 
agenda, at  least in  terms of general  principles. Greater attention to the sequence 
of the  reforms  in  forthcoming  adjustment  programmes  and  a  more  realistic 
approach. to  the  conditions  they  impose,  tailored  to  local  perception  and 
implementation capacities, will be a major feature of  the third phas·e of the SPA. 
In  the same way,  regional  integration and trade promotion programmes will  be 
broadly integrated into adjustment programmes and supported by specific reforms. 
This change of heart among our partner donors to countries undergoing· adjustment 
demonstrates the extent to which participation in the relevant international forums 
can  be  used  to  wield  influence.  At  the  Commission's  instigation  a  general 
consensus has been achieved on the basis of the main principles underpinning the 
Convention, although much work has still  to be done to translate the guidelines 
into practical measures. Case by case, country by country, the tasks awaiting the 
development cooperation community are onerous, but thanks in large measure to 
the Community's input, a realistic, practical and humane approach to adjustment 
has begun to  emerge. 
(c)  To give greater weight to its concerns, the Commission· is chairing the working 
groups responsible for the most sensitive issues: 
the link between democracy and adjustment, the aim being to reconcile economic 
reform policies with the realities of democratization; 
public expenditure reviews designed  to:  improve national  budget planning and 
implementation; restructure spending, giving priority to key social services and the 
maintenance of basic infrastructure; improve spending efficiency and  safeguard 
donors' financial  contributions. 
13 4.  In the recirient countries and regions 
(a)  Wherever  possible,  the  Commission  participates  in  the  preparation  of reform 
programmes, particularly through close i~volvcment in  sectoral  policies. 
(b)  The Commission is increasingly working with the World Bank and other donors 
on public expenditure reviews, focusing its input on  sectoral issues iii  the fields 
of health, education and infrastructure maintenance. 
(c)  The  Commission  is  playing  an  active  role  in  the  following  three. regional 
programmes currently under way in Africa, all designed to promote - to .varying 
degrees - economic integration, customs harmonization, and trade: 
a programme to facilitate intra-regional payments, trade and investment in 
East and southern Africa and the Iridian Ocean; 
a reform programme to set up the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union; 
a  regional  reform  programme  for  the  Central  African  Customs  and 
Economic Union; 
IV.  EFFECTS OF AD.TIJSTMENT:  CONCLUSIONS FOR AND  AGAINST 
1.  Adjustment: unnvoiclahle, but with ambiguous results 
Structural  adjustment  has  for  several  years been  the subject of debate,  criticism  and 
controversy and, more recently, there have been numerous evaluations carried out by such 
bodies as the World Bank, the IMF and UNCTAD. The Commission has contributed to 
this debate with its own study, carried out by a team of European researchers, evaluating 
the results of economic reforms introduced by ACP States.
2 
One common factor that emerges from  all these evaluations is the undoubted difficulty, 
when assessing economic performance, of  mechanistically identifying those effects which 
may be ascribed to policy reforms and those which arc brought about by external factors. 
In the same way, it is hard to gauge objectively the relative impact of  economic recession 
and that of iidjustment. 
The second constant is that the African countries have generally been less successful than 
other developing countries, or their economics have suffered more. 
2  "Adjustment and development -the experience of  the ACP States". This study was 
carried  out  at  the  request  of the  Commission  by  the Centre  d'Etudes  et de 
Rejlexion des Dirigeants  with  UK,  French  and  Italian  researchers,  under  the 
direction of Patrick and Sylvianc Guillaumont. 
14 Some general  positive observations can  be  made about  the  developing countries as  a 
body: 
the countries  that have adopted adjustment polices have,  on  average,  achieved 
faster growth (4.2% in  1986-90) than  those that have not (2.4%); 
adjustment policies have generally reduced budget deficits, from an average 8.5% 
of  GNP in  1980 to 4.2% in  1990 in countries undergoing adjustment, whereas the 
figure  has  remained  a  constant  6.5%  for  the  others  (though  it  has  to  be 
remembered that  such  reduction  was  the central  aim  of the  first  generation of 
stabilization programmes); 
inflation has generally been better controlled in countries undergoing adjustment, 
particularly in  middle-income countries, by  means of extremely tight monetary 
and  lending policies, a key  feature of stabilization programmes; 
in  countries undergoing adjustment, real  exchange rates have been brought back 
to levels that are more commensurate with the economic fundamentals. 
Evaluation has also revealed,  however, some rather more worrying features: 
structural  rigidities have promoted poor resource allocation, to the considerable 
detriment of the social  sectors;  · 
the substantial reductions in public expenditure have been made at the expense of 
maintaining economic and social infrastructure, which has in many cases ceased 
to operate; 
investment has stagnated where it has not decreaseq; 
external imbalances deriving from trade and capital transfer trends have not b'een 
genuinely or durably corrected; 
the external debt situation has not improved, and has in some cases (e.g. Africa) 
deteriorated. 
In other words, financial  stabilization has frequently  been more or less a success in the 
very  short term,  but the underlying economic trends have  not been  reversed  and  the 
positive effects of adjustment, particularly in terms of  growth; have been slow to appear. 
This is certainly the case in Mrica, which was recently the subject of  an additional World 
Bank study in  the context of the SPA ("Adjustment in  Africa", March  1994). 
The  conclusions  of that  study  are  somewhat  reserved.  While  a  limited  number  of 
countries have indeed achieved growth in the agriculture and industry sectors by adopting 
the appropriate macroeconomic policies on agriculture and trade, these results are meagre 
when seen in  the light of population growth and  achievements elsewhere in the world. 
15 Many  countries,  struggling  increasingly  to  meet  their  reform  commitments  and  the 
conditions attached to the support of their donors,  have also been  obliged more or less 
to abandon, or at least cut, their reform programmes. 
This contrasts with the situation in south and south-east Asia, where the economics of the 
newly industrialized countries arc I)OW growing after a brief period of recession. While 
it is true that' these countries had fewer macroeconomic problems to start with and already 
possessed a well-developed private sector that proved capable of adapting to structural 
reforms, the key point is that the specifics of their economic policies have been relatively 
varied, and they have been able to adapt to their own circumstances and strategies the 
theoretical models that have generally underpinned orthodox adjustment policy on trade 
liberalization,  state  intervention  in  production,  and  so  on.  In  fact,  the  only  constant 
discernible among these countries - and  it  is  of tremendous significance - is  the high 
concentration of qualified human resources compared to the average situation in the ACP 
countries, particularly in  Africa. 
The World Bank sought to explain Africa's plight in terms of this lack of  qualified human 
resources,  also  citing  its  inadequate  and  dilapidated  infrastructure,  lack  of economic 
diversity,  fragile economic fabric, inefficient public institutions and economic distortions 
on a  scale not known  elsewhere.  It  concluded  that adjustment would take longer than 
expected in the low-i·ncomc African countries, and  that, to attain the target of long-term 
development,  considerable  sums  should  be  allocated  to  investment,  which  had 
unfortunately been neglected in favour of short-term financial  programmes over the last 
ten years. 
The Community would certainly endorse this conclusion, having for several years argued 
that adjustment should not be imposed at the expense of the long term,  and that short-
term  requirements  should  not  mask the  need  to  finance  basic  infrastructure,  develop 
human resources, ensure food security, etc. 
However, besides purely economic rigidities, there are other factors involved that argue 
in favour of a more realistic approach not only to the results expected from  adjustment, 
but also to the definition of its procedures and conditions. 
.  . 
2.  Some critical comments 
The Commission's commitment to a realistic approach,  now shared in  the SPA context 
as a whole, is based on a critical analysis covering the ACP countries as a body. 
The paper on "Adjustment and development" (see footnote 2) stresses that adjustment has 
encouraged the development of the informal sector, has failed to allow for the long term, 
and has not been. "intermilizcd". 
(a)  Informal  adjustment:  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  informal  sector  has  grown 
significantly over the last ten years. This comes as no surprise. Being subject to 
little official rcgulatio.n,  particularly as regards pay and working conditions, and 
16 requiring little in  the way of capital, the informal  sector is well  placed to adapt 
spontaneously  in  line  with  market  trends.  In  countries  obliged  to  undergo 
structural adjustment to improve compctitiv:eness, the informal sector has a natural 
advantage over the formal. The redundancies that are the inevitable consequence 
of restructuring the public sector have propelled  part of the workforce into an 
informal sector already swollen by population growth. 
Attempts to  reduce budget deficits by raising taxes in  the "modern" sector have 
also given an advantage to informal businesses that pay little or no tax. 
Official GOP statistics undoubtedly make inadequate allowance for the growth of 
the informal  sector. As a  consequence current estimates  lend  undue weight to 
developments in  the "modem" sector,  which does not  reflect the  reality of the 
economic situation, particularly in Africa. This observation should go some way 
to tempering  the excesses of official  pessimism  with  regard  to  Africa  and  its 
underestimation of African capacity to adapt to market trends.  However, it also 
underlines  the  acute  difficulties  faced  by  African  countries  whose  "modern" 
sectors are shrinking in relative terms. 
Yet it is this sector that provides governments with their main source of revenue. 
Essential public services and infrastructure that are vital to the development of  the 
economy as a whole depend on the growth of this sector. 
Informal adjustment has undoubtedly helped alleviate the social  distress caused 
.  by the reforms, but it  has also contributed to the crisis at  national  level.  It can 
therefore never be more than an imperfect, interim phase. 
(b)  Short-sighted  adjustment:  the  process  has  made  inadequate  provtston  for  the 
requisite  complementarities  between  financial  restructuring  and  long-term 
strategies. 
Adjustment  policy  is  made  up  of  three  main  complementary  aspects: 
macroeconomic stabilization, correction of relative prices,  and improvement of 
productivity. In fact, the decisions taken have tended to· favour stabilization at the 
expense of correcting price distortions with structural and sectoral  reforms even 
further in the rear~ these have generally been minimal and without any noticeable 
effect on productivity or the incentives system. Budget allocation trends illustrate 
this clearly. 
The  adjustment  of  public  finances  has  been  achieved  more  by  reducing 
expenditure, with no real  restructuring, than by boosting revenue; the major tax 
reforms.planned have been applied with great difficulty or not at all. 
As a direct result of this tendency there has been a  drastic reduction in  public 
investment, which is now insufficient to guarantee the minimum infrastruchtre and 
maintenance required for the economy to develop.  There has also been a  major 
17 . drop in health and education spending, which is threatening the very  survival of 
these essential public services. 
Between the beginning and  end of the  1980s,  health  and  education spending as 
a  proportion  of total  public  expenditure  fell  by  an  average  of six  percentage 
points, whereas over the same period in non-ACP countries their shares increased 
by six (education) and four (health) percentage points. 
These cuts obviously have a negative impact on  productivity  and  on long-term 
development in general. 
There are several reasons why long-term interests have been passed over. The first 
is  intellectual:  while there is  little disagreement as  to  how to  control  demand, 
. there are doubts on how best to correct prices or gauge the response of economic 
agents and,  even more, on how to boost productivity. 
The second  reason  is to do with  the scale of the  recession  and  the urgency  of 
finding  a  response  to  it.  Foreign  exchange  shortages  and  liquidity  problems 
engendered measures  de~igned to ease the situation rapidly:  it  is  relatively easy 
to reduce spending or alter a customs tariff,  but much  more difficult and time-
consuming to restructure businesses and liberalize and deregulate the economy. 
The imposition of  inflexible conditions, compliance with which can be measured, 
has  reinforced  the  trend,  favouring  measures  having  immediate  results  at  the 
expense of far-reaching reforms the outcome of which it is difficult to gauge. 
(c)  Borrowed  adjustment:  national  reactions to policies  seen  as  imposed  from  the 
outside have  tended  to  be shaped  by .social  and  political  pressures  that  work 
against the process, in some cases compounded by instinctive reticence in the face 
of economic policies that antagonize vested  interest.  Adjustment  policies  have 
frequently been accepted under financial  duress, without any genuine conviction 
on the part of the governme~ts concerned and without the willing support of the 
officials responsible for their implementation, not to mention the general  public, 
which  is  still  awaiting  the  economic  and  social  benefits  of  their  young 
democracies. 
The  lack  of internal  acceptance  also  applies  to  the  conditions  attached  to 
adjustment,  often  agreed  to  simply  as  a  means  of securing  urgently  needed 
financing.  Wary  donors  have  reacted  by  adding  new,  ever  more  stringent 
conditions,  making  them  increasingly  complex,  unrealistic  and  ultimately 
impractical. 
The validity of the concept of conditionality is not open  to discussion.  What is 
debatable,  however,  is  the  excessive  proliferation  of conditions  that  lack  fine 
tuning and fail  to take account of the conditions and constraints specific to each 
individual country. 
18 V.  THE \VAY FORWARD 
Adjustment is  not  a fad,  but  an  absolute necessity  if financial  and  budget stability  is to 
be restored.  There is  a consensus that the  process is  unavoidable,  a necessary  - though 
not  sufficient  - condition  for  growth.  However,  while  the  principle  of adjustment  is 
accepted almost unanimously, opinions are more divided as to the best way  to proceed, 
given  the conflicting, and  indeed disappointing, results achieved by  the policies applied 
thus  far.  Improvements are needed,  and  in  some cases are already  in  the pipeline.  The 
European Union  has championed the need for change, and now has an  important role to 
play  in  promoting  and  strengthening  the  changes.  It  can  do  this  in  three  ways:  by 
consolidating Community action, and  by deepening and  broadening it. 
1.  Consolid':ltior1 
Recent  analysis.  endorses  the  Union's  main  pnont1es  as  expressed  in  the  Lome 
Convention, namely: overall consistency with the objectives of adjustment; the long-term 
implications  of programmes;  their  social  repercussions;  and  their  integration  into  a 
regional  framework.  The key  policy considerations highlighted by  the Convention - the 
social  dimension,  the  regional  dimension,  the pace of reform,  adapting  reforms  to  the 
specific  requirements  of  individual  countries,  acceptance  within  the  country 
("internalization"). realistic conditions - must remain central to the Union's contributions 
in  this field. 
The  Commission  will  therefore  continue  to  argue  the  case  for  the  recent  SPA 
recommendations  on  adapting  the  pace  and  sequence  of  reforms  and  structuring 
conditionality in  line with  the specific requirements of the individual  countries,  with  a 
view to  ensuri.ng  that these recommendations are duly  implemented in practice. 
The  Commission  will  also  help  promote  local  acceptance  of the  adjustment  process 
through  detailed  analysis  of national  planning,  decision7making  and·  implementation 
capacities. The nature of the EU-ACP dialogue, which is characterized by  medium-term 
programming and _confidence in the availability of  resources, is conducive to this purpose. 
Structural  adjustment  must  form  part of a more  general  long-term  approach  aimed at 
developing human  resources, rebuilding a healthy economic and social environment and 
revitalizing the supply side.  In addition to striking the correct balance between spending 
to  support  financial  restructuring  and  economic  reform,  and  investment  spending, 
long-term  aims  can  be  secured  by  improving  the  structure  of public  finance  and 
integrating national  programmes into the regional  framework. 
19 (a)  Public finance 
The Community should continue to attach special importance to the problem of 
public finance,  which has  become one of the key components of reform  and of 
the dialogue with the countries concerned. 
The Community will continue with its role of assisting priority social sectors by 
helping  create  a  genuinely  sectoral  approach  supported  by  the  allocation  of 
counterpart  funds  in  coherent,  transparent,  equitable  and  well-implemented 
national budgets.  The harmonious development of human resources can best be 
achieved through the restmcturing of public expenditure.  It is essential  that the 
process of economic transition be accompanied in the interests of  effectiveness by 
a consistently high level of investment in economic and social  infrastmcture. 
The  focal  areas  for  the  investment  of Community  resources  must  also  be 
broadened, however, to stimulate production and supply, primarily by rationalizing 
and streamlining the state's relations with its suppliers with a view to restoring its 
credibility and the confidence of the business sector. To that end, the Commission 
will  give  priority  to  the  assessment  and  monitoring  of public  expenditure,  m 
collaboration with the countries concerned and the other donors. 
(b)  Integration into the regional  framework 
The integration of national  programmes into a regional  framework designed  to 
promote trade or economic integration will  undoubtedly continue to be one of the 
Commission's main priorities, the aim being to create a dynamic that transcends 
the economies of  individual countries and thus promote the gradual integration of 
the ACP countries into a world economy that is itself in the throes of transition. 
There is a double incentive for the ACP States to incorporate regional integration 
into their national programmes. 
The first is linked to the limitations of national markets. The second is based on 
the new regional  integration  theory,  now held· to be an  institutional  means of 
promoting  the  adoption  of economic  policies  under  partial  protection  from 
pressures that have a  more powerfui impact nationally than at regional level. 
These  arguments  should  persuade the ACP  countries'  international  partners  to 
support the regional aspects of national adjustment programmes on a systematic 
basis, i.e.  automatically including regional integration criteria when formulating 
programmes.  They  should  also  persuade  them  to  increase  the  amount  of 
adjustment aid to these countries, as an incentive to integration and also to offset 
the transitional costs that integration can entail, such as loss of tax revenue. 
20 3.  Broadening 
The European Union's contribution to improving the adjustment process must undoubtedly 
involve more than consolidating and deepening its current input, though they are essential. 
It must also embrace the adaptation of existing instruments, the search for new types of 
cooperation and recasting of the approach to conditionality.  All  this will  require greater 
coordination. 
(a)  Adcwting  instruments  and  procedures:  the  Union  must  adapt  to  changing  and 
varied situations, with a view to: 
providing  direct,  targeted  budget  support  for  countries  with  liberalized 
foreign  trade and a freely  convertible and transferable currency; 
gradually  moving  towards  channelling  counterpart  funds  into  a  more 
general  package,  in  step  with  progress  in  terms  of the  efficiency  and 
internal  acceptance of public expenditure reviews used as  a  tool  to keep 
a check on  programming and  budget implementation.  This will  involve 
radical  changes in the current thinking and methods of the Community's 
supervisory bodies; 
decentralizing implementation monitoring. 
It should  be possible  to  arrange  a  rapid  and  flexible  reallocation  of financial 
resources under a country's adjustment programme to meet exceptional financial 
needs that may arise in certain countries, provided that such reallocations do not 
prejudice development programmes already under way. 
In  order to  secure  greater  consistency  in  its  activities  and  to  create  adequate 
"critical mass" in terms of both conditionality and financial resources, the Union 
will  seek to improve the operational  integration of all  Community instruments, 
including indicative programmes, adjustment resources, Stabex and food aid. 
(b)  Otl~es  of cooperation:  monetary  matters  comprise one area  in  which  the 
Union ·could promote the reform  process in  the ACP States,  as the Maastricht 
Treaty indeed provides. The disparate nature of  the various monetary systems and 
the non-convertible  status of most of the ACP  currencies  have  been  a  major 
handicap to regional integration, while the dearth of foreign exchange has at the 
same time in many cases been an obstacle to economic activity. The international 
community, and especially the EU, can help countries with integration projects in 
the direction of stable exchange rates and  greater convertibility.  This does not 
mean the monetary integration of  the ACP States, Africa or even large subregions. 
It  means  making  Union  expertise  available  to  these  countries  by  extending 
cooperation to an area that, while undoubtedly presenting a tough challenge, can 
make a significant contribution to growth and stability. 
21 (c)  New cw_nroach  to conditionality: there is currently a "conditionality crisis" which 
has  led many  of those actively involved in  the adjustment process to question at 
least  the  application  of the  concept,  if not  its  validity.  There  is  already  a 
consensus at  SPA level  in  favour of introducing a greater note of realism  in  the 
definition  of conditionality.  The  Commission  has  played  a  significant  part  in 
bringing about this development, and  could now contribute further to the debate 
by  proposing a different approach to conditionality, more demanding in  the long 
term  and  less rigid in  the short term. 
This  would  involve  incorporating  into  the  concept  of conditionality  general 
economic  policy  agreements  based  on  a  medium-term  programme,  of which 
specific  measures  would  be  but  one  component.  It  would  also  entail  the 
introduction  of "adjustable"  factors  that  would  allow  economic  policy  to  be 
steered in  response to developments. in  the national or international environment. 
Finally, it would mean assessing the real effort made by countries to push through 
their reforms,  in  the light of material,  social  and  political problems which affect 
economic policy-making, and  which  may  be difficult to overcome. 
Such  an  approach,  by  showing  greater  respect  for  the  internal  choices  of the 
countries  concerned,  particularly  as  regards  the  sequence  of reforms,  would 
increase local involvement in reform planning and implementation, and would also 
allow for greater emphasis on factors promoting long-term development. It would 
tend  to  promote a long-term  view,  responding to  overall  progress on  a realistic 
basis,  rather than  reacting to  one-off results that can be rapidly overturned. 
i 
In  other  words,  the  Commission's  proposal  to  its  partner 'donors  would  be  to 
consider replacing the current conditionality system based on specific instruments 
and  results by  one based  on  programmes. 
(d)  Strengthening  coordination:  in  an  area  as  politically  charged  and  complex  as 
.  macroeconomic reform, where· no one can claim to know all the solutions, it is not 
right that the developing countries should be given the impression that they have 
no say, and that there is a monopoly on macroeconomic expertise. The leadership 
of the key traditional institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, is not in question, 
but  the· Commission  has  developed  a degree  of expertise  and  influence  in  its 
.problem  assessment  and  modus  operandi  which  have  made  a  significant 
contribution to the  improvements already  made to  the adjustment process.  This 
influence would be greatly enhanced by a concerted coordination effort involving 
not only Community structures but also the recipient countries, and the European 
members  of the  Boards of the  Bretton ·Woods institutions themselves.  For the 
Union, it  is a question of credibility as  much as efficiency. 
22 CONCLUSION 
The  Community  was  not  involved  in  the  first  g·eneration  of adjustment  programmes, 
entering  the  debate  in  1987  and  carrying out  its  first  operations  in  1988  through  its 
participation  in  the  first  phase of the SPA.  It  was  really  only  with  Lome  IV  that  the 
Community began to play a direct part in  the process. 
Since the Convention was signed, the Commission has adopted a wide range of measures 
to give full  effect to that participation. The experience gleaned in  the intervening years 
has given it the perspective and the know-how to assess more comprehensively the impact 
of adjustment policies and  to draw conclusions as  to their implications for the future. 
The purpose of this  communication  is  not  only  to  provide  factual  infom1ation  on  the 
implementation of the Convention's structural adjustment provisions, but also to usc that 
experience to contribute to the debate on an aspect of  development that is not only cmcial 
but also one of the most controversial. 
The  Commission  remains  convinced  that  adjustment  is  an  essential  prcreqmstte  for 
relaunching the growth of the ACP countries' economics and,  at a deeper level, for their 
real  development.  However, adjustment procedures have to be  sufficiently  realistic and 
innovative  to  ensure  that  well-balanced  and  equitable  long-term  development  is  not 
sacrificed in  the interests of financial  and  budget stability, and in order to  maximize the 
chances of success of a process that has  so far had  mixed results. 
That is the essence of the Commission's approach and of the role it intends to play in this 
field. 
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